Corporate Venturing, Allocation of Talent, and Competition for Star Managers
提出公司进行风险投资的新理由：竞争人才。高回报促使企业提高激励、重新配置经理到新项目，并以此招募和留住明星经理人，给出了可检验的预测。
We provide new rationales for corporate venturing, based on competition for talented managers. As returns to venturing increase, firms engage in corporate venturing for reasons other than capturing these returns. First, higher venturing returns increase managerial compensation, to which firms respond by increasing incentives. Managers increase effort, prompting firms to reallocate them to new ventures, where the marginal product of effort is highest. Second, as returns to venturing become large, corporate venturing emerges as a way to recruit/retain managers who would otherwise choose alternative employment. We derive several testable empirical predictions about the determinants and structure of corporate venturing.