Information and the hold‐up problem
研究一方在签约前进行沉没投资时，卖方关于投资方回报的信息如何影响敲竹杠问题，重点分析投资可观察性对均衡投资和总剩余的影响。
We examine situations in which a party must make a sunk investment prior to contracting with a second party to purchase an essential complementary input. We study how the resulting hold‐up problem is affected by the seller's information about the investing party's likely returns from its investment. Our principal focus is on the effects of the investment's being observable by the noninvesting party. We establish conditions under which the seller's ability to observe the buyer's investment harms the seller, benefits the buyer, and reduces equilibrium investment and total surplus. We also note conditions under which investment and welfare rise when investment is observable.