Contract Enforcement, Social Efficiency, and Distribution: Some Experimental Evidence
通过实验研究不同合同执行机制对买方集中市场中效率与剩余分配的影响，发现第三方完美执行提升效率，不完美执行时交易者会自我执行，但部分卖家利润低于保留水平，而单边执行则导致效率损失。
We use economic experiments to investigate how different contract enforcement regimes affect efficiency and the distribution of surplus in a vertically coordinated market with buyer concentration. We find that if a third party (e.g., government) perfectly enforces contracts, social efficiency is enhanced. We also find that when third‐party enforcement is imperfect, social efficiency will not necessarily decrease because trading partners find ways to self enforce contracts. However, opportunistic behavior by some traders leaves some sellers (growers) with ex post profits below reservation levels. Finally, partial or one‐sided third‐party enforcement causes significant efficiency losses by constraining subjects' ability to use informal enforcement instruments.