When does incentive compensation motivate managerial behaviors? An experimental investigation of the fit between incentive compensation, executive core self‐evaluation, and firm performance
通过管理模拟实验，研究了激励薪酬与高管核心自我评价及企业绩效的匹配如何影响管理行为，发现高管核心自我评价高时，激励薪酬在组织衰退期更能激发毅力、竞争策略、道德行为和战略冒险。
Abstract We develop and test an integrative model that examines the fit between compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, and situational factors. We propose that a fit among all three factors is crucial to motivate desirable managerial behaviors. Using a specially designed management simulation, our study demonstrates that the effectiveness of incentive compensation to motivate managerial behaviors depends on executives' core self‐evaluation and firm performance. Our results show that, relative to fixed salary compensation, executives with higher core self‐evaluation respond to incentive compensation with greater perseverance, competitive strategy focus, ethical behavior, and strategic risk taking during organizational decline. However, these interaction effects are not present during organizational growth. Our theory and empirical evidence provide significant insights into the complex relationships among compensation schemes, executives' characteristics, firm performance, and managerial behaviors. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.