Optimal Design of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Renegotiation
研究了当政府可以在不确定性消除后重新谈判但补偿效率低下时，贸易协定的最优设计。发现重新谈判总是导致贸易自由化而非保护，最优合同可以是“财产规则”或“责任规则”，且高不确定性偏好责任规则，谈判力不对称偏好财产规则。
We study the optimal design of trade agreements when governments can renegotiate after the resolution of uncertainty but compensation between them is inefficient. In equilibrium, renegotiation always results in trade liberalization, not protection. The optimal contract may be a “property rule” or a “liability rule.” High uncertainty favors liability over property rules, while asymmetries in bargaining power favor property over liability rules. Moreover, optimal property rules are never renegotiated. With a cost of renegotiation, property rules are favored when this cost is higher, reversing a central conclusion of the law-and-economics literature.