通过监管企业间沟通来打击合谋

Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms

Economic Policy · 2001
被引 161
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

基于理论、实验证据和案例研究,提出通过监管特定类型的企业间沟通来间接打击合谋,并识别出具有高反竞争效应但禁止后效率损失小的沟通类型,为竞争政策设计提供简单规则。

Abstract

Summary Fighting collusion Regulation of communication between firmsThis paper is an attempt to create a coherent approach to the design of competition policy enforcement against collusion based on theoretical considerations, evidence from economic experiments, and case studies. I argue that collusion should primarily be fought indirectly by targeting types of communication between firms that are particularly likely to facilitate collusion. In particular, I identify types of communication which have high potential anti-competitive effects but where it is unlikely that prohibiting communication will lead to efficiency losses. This analysis leads to some simple rules concerning communication between firms, which could also guide the development of competition rules for B2B electronic market places.— Kai-Uwe Kühn

合谋规制企业间沟通竞争政策反竞争效应