Contract Design with a Dominant Retailer and a Competitive Fringe
研究了上游企业在下游市场存在一个主导零售商和多个竞争小零售商时，数量折扣和两部收费制在渠道协调中的等价性，发现两种合同设计对上游利润无差异，选择取决于实施便利性。
We show that under some conditions, quantity discounts and two-part tariffs are equivalent as mechanisms for channel coordination when an upstream firm sells its product in a downstream market that is characterized by a dominant retailer and a competitive fringe. We consider a setting in which discriminatory offers are feasible and a setting in which the same menu of options must be offered to all retailers. We find that the upstream firm's profit in both settings is independent of whether quantity discounts or two-part tariffs are used. The implication of this finding is that the firm's choice of contract design may turn on which one is easier to implement. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.