The Information Content of the Interest Rate and Optimal Monetary Policy
在理性预期与合同框架下推导最优货币政策规则，发现若工资制定者利用当前名义利率中的不完全信息，货币政策将变得多余，但货币当局可帮助工资制定者节省指数化成本。
Optimal monetary policy rules are derived in a rational expectations cum contracting framework. Monetary policy is redundant if wage setters exploit the incomplete current information embodied in today's nominal interest rate. However, the monetary authorities can save wage setters the costs of “indexing†to the interest rate. A contemporaneous money supply feedback rule is as effective as wage indexation. A lagged rule, relevant under a regime of money supply targeting, is also as effective if investors use the interest rate. Both rules have the same implications for the real interest rate as Poole's combination policy. However, the two rules have strikingly different implications for the nominal interest rate.