An empirical study of auction revenue rankings: the case of municipal bonds
利用加州386次第一价格市政债券拍卖数据，基于Milgrom和Weber的理论结果，估计反事实收入差异，发现改用英式拍卖可使总收入增加11%—19%，且大部分收益可通过第二价格拍卖实现。
Using a novel dataset of 386 first-price municipal bond auctions held in California, I perform counterfactual revenue comparisons, based on the theoretical result of Milgrom and Weber (1982). I show that the revenue in the second-price auction is nonparametrically identified, and the counterfactual revenue in the English auction can be bounded in an informative way. These results form a basis for nonparametric estimation of counterfactual revenue differences. I find that the revenue gain from using the English auction would be in the range of 11%—19% of the gross underwriting spread, and that most of it would already be captured by using the second-price auction. The recent explosive growth of Internet English auctions, administered by Grant Street Group, provides external support to the claim that auction design matters in this market.