Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation
研究两组不同生产力的工人是否组建联合工会或两个独立工会的决策问题，发现当两组规模或生产力相近时形成联合工会，且工资差异与生产力差异的关系取决于两组相对规模。
We study a union formation decision problem when workers consist of two groups distinguished by different productivities. Workers may form either a joint union or two separate unions. The whole decision process is modelled as an extensive-form bargaining game. Workers form a joint union when the sizes or productivities of the groups are similar. In the first case, there is a wage differential which is more (less) than proportional to the productivity difference if the size of the more productive is smaller (larger) than that of the less productive. In the second case, there is no wage differential.