Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention
研究机构股东如何权衡投机交易与干预公司经营，分析影响干预决策的关键因素，以及短线交易限制和限制性股票对鼓励机构干预的作用。
An institution holding shares in a firm can use information about the firm both for trading (“speculation”) and for deciding whether to intervene to improve firm performance. Intervention increases the value of the institution's existing shareholdings, but intervention only increases the institution's trading profits if it enhances the precision of the institution's information relative to that of uninformed traders. Thus, the ability to speculate can increase or decrease institutional intervention. We examine key factors that affect the intervention decision, the usefulness of “short‐swing” provisions and restricted shares in encouraging institutional intervention, and implications for ownership structure across different firms.