LOCATING OUTSIDE A LINEAR CITY CAN BENEFIT CONSUMERS*
研究Hotelling双寡头模型中限制企业选址对消费者福利的影响，发现引入战略奖励合同后，限制选址反而因改变企业战略承诺而提高价格、降低消费者福利。
ABSTRACT We investigate the effects of restricting the locations of firms in Hotelling duopoly models. In standard location‐price models, the equilibrium distance between firms is too great from the viewpoint of consumer welfare. Thus, restricting the locations of firms and shortening the distance between them improves consumer welfare by reducing prices and transport costs. We introduce strategic reward contracts into location‐price models and find that, in contrast to the above result, restrictions on the locations of firms reduce consumer welfare. These restrictions reduce transport costs but increase prices by changing the strategic commitments of the firms.