Bargaining, Search Costs and Equilibrium Price Distributions
研究消费者随机选择卖家并承担搜索成本时，均衡价格如何通过讨价还价博弈决定，发现卖家类型差异导致价格分散，搜索成本升高时活跃卖家增多，搜索成本趋零时市场趋近完全竞争均衡。
This paper studies a bargaining model of equilibrium price distributions. Consumers choose a seller at random and face search costs to switching to another store. In the market equilibrium, the prices at all stores are determined simultaneously as the perfect equilibrium of a bargaining game. In this game, the buyer has the outside option to search for another seller. Differences between the sellers' types create price dispersions; typically the number of active sellers increases with higher search costs. The market equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium under perfect information when search costs become small.