An Integrated Agency–Resource Dependence View of the Influence of Directors' Human and Relational Capital on Firms' R&D Spending
研究了董事的人力资本和关系资本（如教育背景、创业金融经验、技术经验和连锁董事）如何影响企业研发投入，发现内外董事的独立地位会调节这些资本的作用。
abstract In this paper, we contribute to the agency and corporate entrepreneurship literatures by focusing on board antecedents of research and development (R&D). Some researchers in this stream find outside directors negatively influence R&D spending, yet popular opinion suggests boards should be composed of outsiders, and at the same time, firms should be innovative and entrepreneurial. We begin to address this conflict by extending agency theory and incorporating resource dependence views in order to explore the influence of a wider range of director characteristics on R&D spending, a precursor of innovation and entrepreneurial activity. Our empirical results demonstrate that aspects of directors' human and relational capital (e.g. education, entrepreneurial finance experience, technical experience, and interlocks) significantly influence R&D spending. Our findings illustrate that boards can be configured to improve efficiencies, thereby reducing R&D spending, and/or to augment R&D spending. They reveal the merits of considering inside and outside directors separately and show how the independence (i.e. inside/outside status) of directors shapes the effect of their human and relational capital on R&D spending.