The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions
研究异质性工人与异质性岗位的匹配问题，由于劳动力市场的匿名性，工人采用混合策略申请工作，产生协调摩擦，导致匹配不完全正相关，并分析工资和利润的决定。
This paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs. Owing to the anonymity of a large labor market, workers use mixed strategies when applying for jobs. This randomness generates coordination frictions. Two workers may apply for a particular job, whereas an identical job gets no applications. The model generates assortative matching, with a positive but imperfect correlation between matched workers' and firms' types. It predicts that a worker's wage is increasing in her job's productivity and a firm's profit is increasing in its employees' productivity. The model also yields a version of the welfare theorems.