Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games*
通过实验室实验，研究了惩罚制度及其内生选择如何影响发送者-接收者博弈中的诚实与信任，发现惩罚制度能促进诚实但降低物质收益，且两类人群（有说谎成本者和收益最大化者）的行为与量化反应均衡一致。
Abstract We have conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth‐telling and trust in sender–receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth‐telling beyond standard equilibrium predictions, and they are more likely to choose the sanctioning institution. Sanctioning and non‐sanctioning institutions coexist if their choice is endogenous, and the former shows a higher level of truth‐telling but lower material payoffs. Our experimental findings are consistent with logit agent quantal response equilibrium with two distinct groups of individuals: one consisting of subjects who experience non‐monetary lying costs as senders and non‐monetary costs when being lied to as receivers, and the other consisting of payoff maximizers.