Asymmetric Information, Market Power, and the Underpricing of New Stock Issues in Germany, 1882–1892
研究了1880年代德国新股发行中投资者支付价格与市场售价之间的低利差，发现承销银行利用信息优势和市场势力获取高额费用，不支持1896年严格监管所依据的柠檬市场问题。
Investors in new stock issues in Germany in the 1880s experienced low spreads between the price they paid for stock and the price at which they could sell the stock in the market. Stock issuing companies paid substantial fees to underwriting banks, and these costs increased with the underwriter's market share. Bank's faced lower issuing costs than did nonfinancial firms. These patterns are consistent with a situation in which underwriters exploited their access to better information (agency problems) and had market power, but do not support the supposed lemons problems that motivated the imposition of stringent regulations in 1896.