弱势竞拍者在升价拍卖中注定失败吗?

ARE DISADVANTEGED BIDDERS DOOMED IN ASCENDING AUCTIONS?

Journal of Industrial Economics · 2008
被引 2
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究了在升价拍卖中,弱势竞拍者(预期估值较低)面对强势对手时,仍有一定概率获胜,因此有参与动力,且对手优势不大时对卖家收入影响有限。

Abstract

A bidder is said to be advantaged if she has a higher expected valuation of the auction prize than her competitor. When the prize has a common‐value component, a bidder competing in an ascending auction against an advantaged competitor bids especially cautiously and, hence, the advantaged bidder wins most of the time. However, contrary to what is often argued, a disadvantaged bidder still wins with positive probability, even if his competitor's advantage is very large and even if the disadvantaged bidder has the lowest actual valuation ex‐post . Therefore, the disadvantaged bidder has an incentive to participate in the auction, and the presence of a bidder with a small advantage does not have a dramatic effect on the seller's revenue.

优势竞标者劣势竞标者升序拍卖共同价值