Key Factors of Joint‐Liability Loan Contracts: An Empirical Analysis
实证分析连带责任小额贷款合同，发现连带责任促使低风险借款人组队，并通过同伴监督、支持和压力解决道德风险和执行问题，在贷款官员尽职时还款率接近100%。
Summary This paper provides an empirical analysis of joint‐liability micro‐lending contracts. Using our data set, we examine the efficacy of various incentives set by this contract such as joint‐liability between groups of borrowers or group access to future and to larger loans. As proposed by theory, we find that joint liability induces a group formation of low risk borrowers. After the loan disbursement, the incentive system leads to peer monitoring, peer support and peer pressure between the borrowers, thus helping the lending institution to address the moral hazard and enforcement problem. This paper also demonstrates that the mechanism realizes repayment rates of nearly 100% if the loan officers fulfill their complementary duties in the screening and enforcement process. Finally, we make clear that dynamic incentives, in contrast to theory, have to be restricted if the two long‐term problems of the joint‐liability approach, i.e. its mismatching problem and the domino effect, are to be tackled notably.