Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
提出一种基于最小化监督信息成本的金融中介理论，分析委托监督的激励成本，并证明分散化可降低该成本，即使在风险中性经济中也成立。研究还表明，在模型设定下，含破产成本的债务合同是最优的，对中介的投资组合和资本结构有启示。
This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. It presents a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary. Diversification within an intermediary serves to reduce these costs, even in a risk neutral economy. The paper presents some more general analysis of the effect of diversification on resolving incentive problems. In the environment assumed in the model, debt contracts with costly bankruptcy are shown to be optimal. The analysis has implications for the portfolio structure and capital structure of intermediaries.