Profiling in Bargaining Over College Tuition
用博弈论模型分析大学招生中的特征分析现象，即大学根据与不可观测特质相关的指标给申请者赋权，并用美国私立大学数据验证了信号传递和特征分析的重要性。
Profiling in college admissions arises when applicant attributes are given weight because they are correlated with unobservable student characteristics that the college values. The article models the admission process of a single college as a bargaining game between the college and a potential student with sequential moves and asymmetric information. We test the empirical implications of this model using a unique data set from a private college in the US. We find that the empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that signalling and profiling are important aspects of the college admission process. Copyright 2006 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2006.