Discipline and Liquidity in the Interbank Market
利用20年面板数据，发现高风险银行在银行间贷款中支付更高利率且较少使用这些贷款作为流动性来源；1990年代中期监管变化后，价格纪律和风险配给效应显著增强。
Using 20 years of panel data, I demonstrate that high‐risk banks have consistently paid more than safe banks for interbank loans and have been less likely to use these loans as a source of liquidity. The economic importance of this effect was relatively small until the mid‐1990s, when regulatory and institutional changes began to impose more of the costs of bank failure on uninsured creditors. Subsequently, interbank‐market price discipline roughly doubled, and risk‐based rationing effects increased by a factor of six. In imposing this discipline, lenders seem to care most about credit risk at borrowing institutions.