Disclosure-Disciplining Mechanisms: Capital Markets, Product Markets, and Shareholder Litigation
说明企业权衡好消息（降低资本成本）与坏消息（减少专有成本）的披露，可在对立效应平衡时促使经理真实披露；专有成本增加可提高披露可信度、增加自愿负面披露频率并改善企业福利；股东诉讼仅在特定条件下与市场力量互动增强披露可信度。
This paper demonstrates that a firm's trade-offs between reporting good news to reduce the cost of capital and bad news to minimize proprietary costs can induce the firm's manager to provide truthful disclosures when the opposing effects balance each other. We also show that greater proprietary costs can make a firm's disclosures more credible, increase the frequency of voluntary adverse disclosures, and improve the disclosing firm's welfare. Further, we find that potential shareholder litigation can interact with capital and product markets' influences to make voluntary disclosures more credible, but only under certain circumstances. For example, although product market competition can complement the capital market effects in inducing the manager to provide truthful disclosures, shareholder litigation cannot complement the capital market in the same way. Nevertheless, while shareholder litigation can never induce misreporting, a very strong product market influence can prompt a firm to underreport its true economic condition.