Debt Concentration and Bargaining Power: Large Banks, Small Banks, and Secondary Market Prices
研究发展中国家债务集中度（大银行相对小银行持有的债务比例）如何影响贷款在二级市场的价格，发现集中度越高价格越高，并用议价模型解释这一现象。
Commerical bank debts of developing countries are held by large international banks and smaller domestic banks. This paper investigates how debt concentration—the proportion of a country's debt held by large banks relative to small banks—affects the secondary market price for these loans. We find that countries with higher concentrations have higher secondary‐market prices. We explain this empirical finding in a bargaining model that endogenizes the maximum penalty that banks can credibly impose on a recalcitrant debtor. We show that the banks' bargaining power increases with the degree of debt concentration, thus increasing repayment and secondary‐market prices.