Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts
构建了一个劳动力市场匹配模型，企业提供工资-任期合同，工人（包括在职和失业者）搜寻新工作。在工人风险厌恶假设下，存在唯一均衡，工资随任期平滑增长，且初始工资分布非退化。
In this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage-tenure contracts and workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job op-portunities. Given workers are risk averse, we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered. Although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium, all post a wage-tenure contract that implies a worker’s wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm. As firms make different offers, there is job turnover, as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises. This implies the increase in a worker’s wage can be due to job-to-job movements as well as wage-tenure effects. Further, there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage. We also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters.