Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and Unemployment Fluctuations
构建了一个动态一般均衡模型，其中工资由双边议价决定且企业拥有信息优势。信息不对称导致失业波动和工资粘性，负面冲击后工资缓慢下降，失业持续增加，并发现议价相比隐性合同效率较低。
We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model where wages are determined by bilateral bargaining and the firm has superior information. The asymmetry of information introduces unemployment fluctuations and dynamic wage sluggishness. Because the information of the firm is only revealed gradually, wages fall slowly in response to a negative shock and unemployment exhibits additional persistence. It is shown that high job destruction will generally be followed by a period of higher than average job destruction, that the presence of common shocks introduces an informational externality, and that bargaining is an inefficient method of wage determination as compared to implicit contracts.