Early Interventions and Disability Insurance: Experience from a Field Experiment
通过瑞典疾病保险系统的田野实验，评估早期职业康复需求评估的效果，发现其中一种干预使残疾福利领取增加20%，对失业者影响更大，符合道德风险与信息不对称的理论模型。
We estimate the effects of early assessments of an individual’s need for vocational rehabilitation in the Swedish sickness insurance system using a field experiment. One of the interventions increases the flow to disability benefits by 20%. The effect is larger for unemployed individuals, who also are covered by the sickness insurance scheme. This result is in line with a theoretical model with moral hazard and asymmetric information in which individuals with low work incentives communicate worse health in response to the assessment for rehabilitation which then increases the hazard to disability benefits.