Consumer-surplus-enhancing collusion and trade
研究了一个差异化双寡头在两地市场中的合谋模型，发现合谋在某些情况下能提高进口品价格但降低本土品价格，从而提升大多数消费者的福利和总消费者剩余。
That collusion among sellers hurts buyers is a central tenet in economics. We provide an oligopoly model in which collusion can raise consumer surplus. A differentiated-product duopoly operates in two geographically-separated markets. Each market is home to a single firm, but can import, at a cost, from the foreign firm. Under some circumstances, a perfect cartel, relative to duopolistic competition, raises the price of the imported good and lowers the price of the home good. This raises welfare for most consumers and increases aggregate consumer surplus. A similar possibility result applies to autarky. Our analysis applies beyond the spatial setting.