Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
研究一个委托人与多个代理人之间的双边契约，当代理人效用受委托人与其他代理人不可观测契约影响时，通过允许委托人选择菜单契约来限制均衡结果，并分析竞争收敛及两种常见博弈的额外约束。
The paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility depends on the principal's unobservable contracts with other agents. We show that allowing deviations to menu contracts from which the principal chooses bounds equilibrium outcomes in a wide class of bilateral contracting games without imposing ad hoc restrictions on the agents' beliefs. This bound yields, for example, competitive convergence as N →∞ in environments in which an appropriately-defined notion of competitive equilibrium exists. We also examine the additional restrictions arising in two common bilateral contracting games: the "offer game" in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents, and the "bidding game" in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal.