竞争性利他、心智化与信号传递

Competitive Altruism, Mentalizing, and Signaling

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2014
被引 22
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

结合心智化与性选择理论,论证利他者通过付出代价的信号传递能获得更好的匹配机会,并在长期关系中提升双方收益。

Abstract

One explanation of altruism is that it arises from “mentalizing,” the process of understanding the mental states of others. Another is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. This paper shows that these two arguments are stronger together in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over nonaltruists when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly, when such signaling allows better matching opportunities. Finally, it shows how mentalizing leads to higher payoffs for both partners in a long-term relationship, modeled as a repeated game with private monitoring.

竞争利他主义心智化信号传递