An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self‐Interest on Corporate Capital Structure
实证检验资本结构决策是否部分受管理者自利动机驱动，发现债务比率与管理层持股负相关，且除非存在非管理大股东，否则债务难以显著增加。
ABSTRACT This paper provides a test of whether capital structure decisions are at least in part motivated by managerial self‐interest. It is shown that the debt ratio is negatively related to management's shareholding, reflecting the greater nondiversifiable risk of debt to management than to public investors for maintaining a low debt ratio. Unless there is a nonmanagerial principal stockholder, no substantial increase of debt can be realized, which may suggest that the existence of large nonmanagerial stockholders might make the interests of managers and public investors coincide.