Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India
研究了印度政客如何通过频繁调动官僚来控制他们，以及高技能官僚和种姓关系如何影响职业成功，对理解政治与官僚互动有用。
We develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns, and the consequent implications for bureaucrats' career investments. Unique micro-level data on Indian bureaucrats support our key predictions. Politicians use frequent reassignments (transfers) across posts of \nvarying importance to control bureaucrats. High-skilled bureaucrats face less frequent political transfers and lower variability in the importance of their posts. We find ev- \nidence of two alternative paths to career success: officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in skill, but caste affinity to the politician's party base also helps secure important positions.