Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance*
研究发现，警察在仲裁中未获得期望薪酬后，逮捕率和平均刑期下降，犯罪报告增加，且薪酬差距越大绩效下降越明显，支持参照点影响工作行为的理论。
Several theories suggest that pay raises below a reference point will reduce job performance. Final offer arbitration for police unions provides a unique opportunity to examine these theories, as the police officers either receive their requested wage or receive a lower one. In the months after New Jersey police officers lose in arbitration, arrest rates and average sentence length decline, and crime reports rise relative to when they win. These declines in performance are larger when the awarded wage is further from the police union's demand. The findings support the idea that considerations of fairness, disappointment, and, more generally, reference points affect workplace behavior.