Managerial hedging, equity ownership, and firm value
研究风险厌恶的管理者通过金融市场对冲企业现金流风险中的宏观部分，但无法对冲企业特有风险，这导致他们放弃企业特有项目而选择宏观风险更高的标准项目，从而引发道德风险，并解释管理层持股与企业绩效之间的经验关系。
Suppose risk‐averse managers can hedge the aggregate component of their exposure to firm's cash‐flow risk by trading in financial markets but cannot hedge their firm‐specific exposure. This gives them incentives to pass up firm‐specific projects in favor of standard projects that contain greater aggregate risk. Such forms of moral hazard give rise to excessive aggregate risk in stock markets. In this context, optimal managerial contracts induce a relationship between managerial ownership and (i) aggregate risk in the firm's cash flows, as well as (ii) firm value. We show that this can help explain the shape of the empirically documented relationship between ownership and firm performance.