von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
研究了一对一匹配问题中，当参与者具有远见时，哪些匹配可能稳定，发现冯·诺依曼-摩根斯坦远见稳定集只能是核心中的单点集，且该结论可推广到多对一匹配。
We adopt the notion of vonNeumann–Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets\nto determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNMfarsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets (Ehlers 2007), vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.