The city vs. firm subsidy game
将城市与寻求补贴的企业之间的冲突建模为信号博弈，分析企业利用搬迁威胁获取补贴时，游说活动对社会福利的影响取决于企业拥有有利搬迁机会的概率。
The conflict between a city and a subsidy-seeking firm is modelled as a signalling game. Each firm has private information regarding its relocation opportunities and uses the threat of moving and the resulting loss in tax revenues to obtain a subsidy. The analysis shows that lobbying can be a socially desirable or undesirable activity depending on the probability of the firm having a profitable opportunity to move to some other city. If this probability is low, the city can increase welfare by committing to investigate the firm's claim before giving a subsidy.