Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk
研究了恐惧作为冲突动机时合作的决定因素和威慑的有效性，对比了完全信息与战略风险下的结果，发现武器存量对合作可持续性的影响是非单调的，军事力量不对称可能促进和平。
We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different information about their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict. In our model, weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information. In contrast, under strategic risk, we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a nonmonotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation. We also show that under strategic risk, asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace, and that anticipated peacekeeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior. (c) 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..