Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets
基于Diamond(1985)的资产市场模型，研究发现央行透明度提高可能挤出私人信息，导致市场预测货币政策能力下降，因此央行在信息精度中等时最优选择是少披露信息。
We use an asset market model based on Diamond (1985) to demonstrate that increased central bank transparency may lead to crowding out of costly private information, which can result in a market that is less able to predict monetary policy. Consequently, for intermediate levels of public information precision, it is optimal for the central bank to actually disclose less than it knows. We show that such crowding out can occur, even in the likely scenario that public information is more precise than private information, under the plausible assumption that traders are nearly risk neutral. Central banks should be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market participants reduce investment in information.