The Disciplining Effect of Concern for Referrals: Evidence from Real Estate Agents
研究房地产经纪人因担心失去客户转介而受到约束，发现搬离的卖家房屋售出率更高、更快但价格更低，且对声誉更看重的经纪人约束效应更强。
Real estate agents rely on clients for referrals to generate future business; this article examines whether concern for referrals disciplines agents. We compare results for sellers who move to another area (and are less likely to provide referrals) with results for sellers who remain in the area (and are more likely to provide referrals). We find that moving‐away sellers’ houses have a higher sale rate, sell faster and sell for less (even after controlling for moving‐away sellers’ greater impatience). We also provide evidence that the disciplining effect of concern for referrals is stronger for agents who place a greater value on reputation. Finally, among sellers who are better at evaluating and monitoring agents, we see less of the high sell rate, low sale‐price effect.