Factors Influencing Pay Decisions: Balancing Managerial Vulnerabilities
研究管理者在依赖下属时如何分配加薪，发现高绩效和高专业技能的员工获得更多加薪，但影响策略（如抱怨或讨好）效果有限。
This study investigated the pay raise distributions of allocators when their job situations make them particularly dependent on subordinates. The study compared recommended pay raises when the worker was a high or average performer, had high or low specialized expertise relative to the particular work unit circumstances, and either used no influence attempt, voiced an inequity complaint, or engaged in ingratiating behaviors involving complimenting the manager and expressing conformity with the manager's views. The situation was described as one in which high performance was important, the staff was somewhat underpaid, and availability of alternative employment in the external job market was good. As expected, larger raises were assigned people with better performance. However, allocators also gave significantly higher pay raises when the subordinate had high specialized expertise relative to the particular circumstance. Contrary to predictions, however, influence attempts were not significantly better than no action in obtaining pay raises, although an inequity complaint was significantly more successful than ingratiating behaviors. The implications of the findings for future research are discussed.