The Value of the Initial Payment of the Canadian Wheat Board as a Signaling Device
研究了加拿大小麦局在信息不对称下，通过初始付款向美国竞争者传递产量信号，以影响出口价格和销售，并发现不完全信息下的初始付款高于完全信息情况。
Abstract This paper analyzes the role of the initial payment used by the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) in the determination of export prices and sales under the assumption that the CWB has better information about realized yields in Canada than its US competitor. In the separating equilibrium of the game, the initial payment of the CWB is larger than the initial payment under complete information. There exists an incentive under incomplete information to send a signal that realized yields are greater than expected to induce a reduction in the sales of foreign competitors. We illustrate the strategic value of the initial payment for Canadian wheat producers using a numerical simulation.