Do Bank-Affiliated Analysts Benefit from Lending Relationships?
研究发现，当企业从关联银行借款后，银行附属分析师的盈利预测准确性会提高，这种优势在信息不对称高、坏消息多以及有财务契约的贷款中更明显，且仅当关联银行担任主牵头行时才存在。
This paper investigates whether private information from lending activities improves the forecast accuracy of bank‐affiliated analysts. Using a matched sample design, matching by affiliated bank or borrower, we demonstrate that the forecast accuracy of bank‐affiliated analysts increases after the followed firm borrows from the affiliated bank. We also find that the increase in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for borrowers with greater information asymmetry and bad news, and for deals with financial covenants. Last, we find that the informational advantage of bank‐affiliated analysts exists only when the affiliated banks serve as lead arrangers, not merely as participating lenders. Overall, our evidence suggests that information flows from commercial banking to equity research divisions within financial conglomerates.