Integration Through Incentives Within Differentiated Organizations
研究了组织差异化与整合如何影响协作激励的有效性，发现忽视协调挑战不仅无法实现激励整合的收益，反而可能降低组织绩效，对跨部门关系与并购后整合有启示。
Drawing on the concepts of organizational differentiation and integration, we present a formal analysis of the manner in which these two consequences of specialization shape the effectiveness of collaborative incentives in complex organizations. We show that ignoring the coordination challenges created by differentiation does not merely impede the achievement of gains from integration through incentives, but can lower organizational performance below the levels achieved when such gains are simply ignored. Thus, treating interunit collaboration purely as a problem of motivating cooperation can be counterproductive. We describe implications in the context of interdivisional relationships and postmerger integration.