Agency problems as antecedents to unrelated mergers and diversification: Amihud and Lev reconsidered
重新检验了Amihud和Lev（1981）关于经理人通过无关并购降低就业风险的代理理论假设，使用1960年代和1980年代的数据发现，大股东监督并未显著影响经理人的战略行为或公司绩效。
Amihud and Lev (1981) are widely cited as providing evidence that managers, unless closely monitored by large block shareholders, will attempt to reduce their employment risk through unrelated mergers and diversification. These corporate strategies, however, may not be in shareholders' interests. Reconsidering the agency assumptions underlying Amihud and Lev's study and the methodology they used, we develop hypotheses regarding the association between ownership structure, board vigilance, corporate strategy, and corporate performance from management theory and test them using Amihud and Lev's data from the 1960s and new data from the 1980s. Neither study supports the conclusions of Amihud and Lev, nor the agency theory belief that monitoring efforts by principals affect the strategic behaviors of agents or the performance of firms that they manage. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.