Charter Value, Risk‐Taking Incentives, and Emerging Competition for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
分析联邦住房贷款银行抵押贷款购买计划和巴塞尔II资本要求可能加剧美国二级抵押贷款市场竞争，降低房利美和房地美的特许权价值，进而诱发其更冒险行为，提醒监管者加强警惕。
This paper examines two forces that may soon increase competition in the U.S. secondary conforming mortgage market: (1) the Federal Home Loan Bank mortgage purchase programs, and (2) the adoption of revised risk‐based capital requirements for large U.S. banks (Basel II). We argue that this competition is likely to reduce the growth and relative importance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and hence reduce their charter values and effective capital. Such developments could, in turn, lead to more risky behaviors by these two companies. This last consequence warrants greater supervisory awareness and legal authorities.