Optimal CEO Compensation: Some Equivalence Results
研究两种契约环境下的最优经理合同，发现基于现金、限制性股票和股票期权的三种合同在实现相同结果和经理预期收益上是等价的，表明契约形式的选择无关紧要。
I study optimal managerial contracts in two contracting environments. When the investment return is contractible, an optimal contract combines a base salary, golden parachute, and bonus. When the return is not contractible, two types of optimal contracts are studied: a contract with restricted stock and a contract with stock options. These three types of contracts are equivalent: they implement the same outcome and lead to the same expected payoff for the manager, implying that the choice of contractual form is irrelevant in the environment I study. I suggest directions of research for the relevance of different contractual forms.