Bilateral Control with Vertical Contracts
指出下游企业间秘密签约时，被动信念均衡可能不存在，而警惕信念更合理；在广泛情形下警惕信念均衡存在并反映机会主义，且转售价格维持可消除机会主义。
A supplier is known to be subject to opportunism when contracting secretly with downstream competitors, particularly when downstream firms have "passive beliefs."We stress that in many situations, an equilibrium with passive beliefs may not exist and passive beliefs appear less plausible than "wary beliefs," introduced by McAfee and Schwartz.We show that in a broad range of situations, equilibria with wary beliefs exist and reflect opportunism.Last, we confirm the insight, derived by O'Brien and Shaffer using a more ad-hoc equilibrium concept, that RPM eliminates the scope for opportunism.