Watchdog or Lapdog? A Behavioral View of the Media as a Corporate Governance Mechanism
研究揭示企业通过象征性的董事会独立性改革来维护管理层利益，却仍能获得媒体正面报道，进而影响CEO职位安全、高管薪酬和董事会构成，质疑媒体作为治理机制的有效性。
This study begins to provide a behavioral view of the media and corporate governance by showing how firms enact largely symbolic governance changes with respect to board independence that essentially protect managerial interests, yet still elicit positive responses from the media. I show why this media response is important for firm leaders by examining how more favorable media coverage may affect CEO job security, executive compensation, and board composition. To the extent that largely symbolic actions affect media coverage, this study raises questions about the effectiveness of the media as a governance control mechanism.