Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts
研究了企业在使用隐性契约（奖金）时，如何最优地设计工作形式：将员工分配到单一岗位（个人分配）还是组成团队共同负责（团队分配）。团队分配能缓解多任务问题，但可能削弱隐性契约。只有声誉关注度高的企业才选择团队分配，但若结合显性绩效工资，这一规则可能不成立。
We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts.