Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
通过实验比较了标准拍卖、最优拍卖与两种阿姆斯特丹拍卖变体，发现第二价格阿姆斯特丹拍卖在竞拍者实力悬殊时收入显著高于标准形式，仅略低于最优拍卖。
The Amsterdam auction has been used to sell real estate in the Dutch capital for centuries. By awarding a premium to the highest losing bidder, the Amsterdam auction favors weak bidders without having the implementation difficulties of Myerson's (1981) optimal auction. In a series of experiments, we compare the standard first-price and English auctions, the optimal auction, and two variants of the Amsterdam auction. With strongly asymmetric bidders, the second-price Amsterdam auction raises substantially more revenues than standard formats and only slightly less than the optimal auction. Copyright Econometric Society 2004.